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NOTIFICATION REGISTRATION UNDER
THE PROPOSED OHIO SECURITIES ACT:
THE SECTION 1707.08(A)(3) LOOPHOLE
The author examines the requirements of section 1707.08(AX3) of
the proposed Ohio Securities Act and concludes that the provision is
inadequate to ensure that only high-grade securities will be permitted
the advantages of notification registration. Not only does the section
permit extensive dilution of the purchaser's interest in tangible assets,
but it also permits dilution of all assets far in excess of 40 percent.
The statutory limitation on the number of purchasers and the section's
good faith requirement are also criticized. For these reasons the
author recommends that the section not be enacted.
I. PATTERNS OF BLUE SKY REGISTRATION
STATE BLUE SKY laws are designed to protect the investing pub-
lic from fraud, lack of full disclosure, high-pressure sales tactics
and the sale of securities that are financially unsound.1 The state
approach, which is primarily concerned with the "merits" of an offer-
ing, differs from that of the federal government, which emphasizes
full disclosure of all pertinent facts so that investors may make in-
formed decisions with respect to the securities offered.2 At the state
level administrators have considerable discretion to look into the
merits of a proposed offering, as well as to require disclosure through
an offering circular or prospectus. 3 State administrators have been
granted this additional authority because mere disclosure in a pros-
pectus may furnish inadequate protection for the investor.4
1. J. MOFSKY, BLuE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEw BushiEss PROMOTIONS
15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MOFsKY]. The Ohio Blue Sky Law is no ex-
ception. See Grosby v. State, 109 Ohio St. 543, 550, 143 N.E. 126, 128
(1924); Nida, The Ohio Division of Securities and the Ohio Securities Act,
13 Omo ST. LJ. 427, 434-35 (1952) (original purpose was prevention and
punishment of fraud, but amendments increased discretion of administrator to
rule on soundness of issue); Note, Ohio Securities Act: Powers, Sanctions and
Constitutional Objections, 17 W. Ras. L. REv. 1098, 1098 (1966).
2. In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947); 1 L. Loss, SEcumiTms Rcs-
ULATION 121-28 (2d ed. 1961); cf. Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Fed-
eral Securities Regulation, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1974).
3. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SncuRrrs AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
§ 14.08 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BLOOMENTHAL]; MOFsKY 15-17. See also
Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Law, 2 FLA. ST. L. Rnv. 1, 3 (1974).
4. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 523-24 (1934);
Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation,
15 WAYNE I- REV. 1417, 1417-20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Huem]. See
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One means of regulating an issue is to require the registration
of securities prior to sale within the state.5 The three most common
methods of registration are coordination, qualification, and notifica-
tion.6 These three forms of registration exist in various combinations
in different states." Coordination is a simplified method of registra-
tion that is only available for those securities that are also being reg-
istered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Se-
curities Act of 1933.8 The two forms of registration used by the
majority of states are qualification and notification. 9 Generally, any
security is eligible for registration by qualification,' ° which requires
far more detailed and elaborate information than notification regis-
tration.:1 This more complete disclosure requirement provides the
administrator with sufficient information to make decisions concern-
ing the "merits" of the proposed offering.' 2  In order for the state-
ment to become effective, the administrator must take some affirma-
tive action.13
Notification registration, on the other hand, involves the pre-
sentation of abbreviated factual information to the administrator' 4
Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 311, 351-53 (1974). See also SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL
STuDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 134-37 (1963) (discussion of the need for state blue sky legisla-
tion to supplement federal regulation of securities industry).
5. Other modes of regulation include the registration and licensing of
broker-dealers. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.14 (Page Supp. 1973);
UNiroRm SEcURrriEs ACT §§ 201-04 [hereinafter cited as USA].
6. See MoFsKY app. E, at 162-67 (chart of registration methods in dif-
ferent states).
7. Id. Registration by description, which is available in Ohio and a few
other states, is the equivalent of notification registration. See, e.g., OHIo Rav.
CODE ANN. § 1707.08 (Page 1964).
8. USA § 303 (1970); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11 510-11 (1973); R. JEN-
NINGS & H. MARSH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 583
(3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS & MARSH]. This method of
registration is a recent development in the Uniform Securities Act. For
earlier suggestions of coordination of federal and state acts, see Smith, The
Relation of Federal and State Securities Laws, 4 LAw & CoNrNTv. PROB. 241,
254-55 (1937); Wright, Correlation of State Blue Sky Laws and The Federal
Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 258, 278-81 (1941).
9. MOFSKY app. E, at 162-67.
10. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 110A, § 303(a) (Supp. 1974).
11. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 511 (1973); see note 32 infra.
12. Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969
DUKE L.J. 273, 274-75.
13. JENNINGS & MARSE 583.
14. See note 32 infra.
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and becomes automatically effective after a short period of time.1"
For this reason, notification registration is reserved for certain "high-
grade" issues.16  However "high-grade" is defined, 17 the classifica-
tion is based on a determination that the security is almost certainly
fair and its potential for fraud is so low that extended review of the
merits of the issue is unnecessary.18 These securities are generally
issued by corporations with an extremely favorable earnings record, or
they are secured by mortgages on real estate or pledged collateral of a
substantial nature.19 Owing to the limited scrutiny these securities
receive, this method of registration should be available only to those
securities that meet both of the following requirements: there is a
low probability of the issue being tainted by fraud and the financial
package will very probably meet whatever merit standard is used
by the state. It is important to note that a high level of assurance
that there is no unfairness (both in the substance of the investment
and in the extent of disclosure accompanying the offering) is as signi-
ficant as the diminished likelihood of fraud. This is so for the rather
15. Compare MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 451.702(c) (1967) (20 days)
with KA. STAT. ANN. § 17-1256(c) (1964) (2 days).
16. JENNINGS & MARSH 583.
17. See, e.g., USA § 302(a); see note 19 infra.
18. See note 33 infra. See generally Boesel, Analysis of The Ohio Securi-
ties Act, 5 W. RES. L. REv. 352, 361 (1954), and Note, Registration Provisions
Under the Ohio Blue Sky Law, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 1126, 1128 (1966), which
discuss registration by description in Ohio.
19. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. f 510 (1973). In Ohio three types of securities
may be registered by description: (1) securities issued by a going concern
which has proved its stability, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.05(A) (Page
1964); (2) securities backed by interests in land mortgages, land tracts, or
steamships, id. H§ 1707.05(B)-(D); (3) securities for which the company has
collateral deposited in trust with a bank, id. § 1707.05(E). In addition there
are four types of transactions that may be registered by this simplified method:
(1) sales of securities for tangible property located within the state and with
a limited commission, id. § 1707.06(A) (1); (2) sales of securities to not more
than fifteen shareholders, id. § 1707.06(A)(2); (3) sales of securities to an
unincorporated entity with not more than 10 members, id. § 1707.06(A)(3);
and (4) sales of securities to current holders, id. § 1707.06(A) (4). The Ohio
Division of Securities [hereinafter referred to as the Division] has been par-
ticularly concerned with the difficulties raised by § 1707.06(A)(1). See
note 62 and accompanying text infra.
For a discussion of notification registration in other states, see Dorwart &
Holden, An Overview of the Oklahoma Securities Act, 25 Oz.A. L. REv. 184,
202 (1972) (must have a "track record"); Rediker, Alabama's "Blue Sky Law"
-Its Dubious History and its Current Renaissance, 23 AiA. L. REv. 667, 681
(1971) (issues that meet the requirements are more seasoned); Rooks, The
Blue Sky Law of Washington: Registration of Securities of a New Venture,
6 GONZAGA L. REv. 187, 195-96 (1971) (notification not available for securi-
ties of a new venture). MoFSKY app. E, at 162-67, provides a listing of all
state statutes which permit notification registration.
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obvious reason that the administrator has no real opportunity to scru-
tinize the offering for fairness because of the speed with which a
registration becomes effective and the relatively limited amount of
information concerning the issuer available to him.20
II. THE PROPOSED O o SEcuRITms ACT
The proposed Ohio Securities Act2' provides for all three meth-
ods of registration. Section 1707.08 provides for notification reg-
istration. Under section 1707.08(A), there are six types of offer-
ings that are eligible for such registration. This Note will focus
on section 1707.08(A)(3), which is designed to permit notifica-
tion registration of securities that are not expected to work a substan-
tial dilution of the purchaser's interest. Despite this design, the pro-
posed section allows registration even though there may be dilution
of the purchaser's investment so great that the offering may well be
unreasonable or unfair.
A particular offering may be registered in accordance with this
section if all of the following four conditions are met:
a. At least sixty percent of -the total consideration paid or
given for all of the securities being offered or proposed to
be offered, whether or not they are proposed to be regis-
tered or offered in this state, plus all other securities issued
by the issuer within -the two year period preceding the date
the registration statement is filed, is cash or tangible prop-
erty;22
b. Such security is part of an issue purchased by not more
.than twenty-five persons in this state;23
c. The total of commissions and other remuneration paid
or given directly or indirectly for soliciting offerees and
any other expenses incurred directly or indirectly in con-
nection with the offering, except legal, accounting, and
printing expenses incurred by the issuer, does not at any
time during the period of distribution exceed three percent
of the proceeds received at such time from the sale of such
securities;24
d. Such security is registered and distributed in good
faith and not for the purpose of avoiding chapter 1707.
of the Revised Code.25
20. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text infra.
21. Ohio S.B. 338, 110th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1973-74) [here-
inafter cited as OSA].
22. OSA §§ 1707.08(A) (3)(a)-(d).
23. Id. § 1707.08(A)(3)(b).
24. Id. § 1707.08(A)(3)(c).
25. Id. § 1707.08(A)(3)(d).
1975]
310 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:306
This section. continues by defining "tangible property" for the pur-
pose of subsection (a) to include:
All property other -than patents, copyrights, secret proc-
esses, formulas, services, good will, promotion and organi-
zation fees and expenses, trademarks, trade brands, trade
names, licenses, franchises, or any other assets treated
as intangible according -to generally accepted accounting
principles and practices, or any securities, accounts receiv-
able, or contract rights having no readily determinable
value; but the term "tangible property" includes securities,
accounts receivable, and contract rights when -they have a
readily determinable value.2 0
For the purpose of subsection (b) above, "person" is defined to in-
clude:
[A] legal or beneficial owner, except that each of the follow-
ing are deemed to be a single purchaser: husband and
wife, a child and its parent or guardian when the parent
or guardian holds the security for -the benefit of the child,
a corporation, a partnership, an association or other un-
incorporated entity, a joint-stock company, or a trust, but
only if the entities or trusts described in this paragraph
were not formed for the purpose of purchasing such secur-
ity.2 7
A registration statement filed under this provision becomes effec-
tive automatically five business days after filing unless there is a pro-
ceeding pending or a stop order is issued. 28 Section 1707.12 lists
ten grounds for the issuance of a stop order. Those most important
to this discussion are the following: The offering has been or would
be grossly unfair to the purchasers;29 the offering has worked or
26. Id. Note that the present form of the proposed Act does not reflect
the suggestion of the Advisory Board to eliminate from the definition of tangi-
ble property the reference to certain intangibles having a readily determinable
value, which is presently embodied in § 1707.01(L)(2). Minutes of the
Advisory Board on Revision of Ohio Securities Law, June 5, 1971, at 6, 7
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Board Minutes]. This suggestion was prompted
by the valuation problem discussed in note 62 and accompanying text infra.
27. OSA § 1707.08(A) (3) (d).
28. Id. § 1707.08(D). § 1707.08(E)(I) permits the statement to become
effective upon the date of mailing if the registrant guarantees he will
refund all proceeds if a stop order is issued retroactively. However, if there
is no fund to draw upon, this provision is ineffective.
29. Id. § 1707.12(A) (6). However, before the administrator can act un-
der this section, he must have promulgated rules that develop specific standards
and criteria defining what is grossly unfair. There is a need for such stand-
ards. JENNINGS & MARsH 584. But see MoFsnv 16 (rules and regulations give
a sense of specificity and objectivity that is misleading in view of the number
of variables).
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tended to work a fraud on the purchaser, or would so operate;30 and
the offering is ineligible for notification registration.31 However, the
information available to make a decision concerning the fairness of
the proposed offering is limited.32  This factor, combined with the
5-day automatic effectiveness provision, prevents the administrator
from giving the offering anything more than superficial inspection.
Therefore, the presumption must be that issues that satisfy the four
requirements of section 1707.08 (A) (3) will be fair.33  This sec-
tion, however, permits notification registration of a security that
bears a high probability of fraud, and even if the issue is free from
fraud, the result may be contrary to what is generally accepted as
fair.
An example of the operation of this provision may be instructive.
Suppose at the time corporation X is formed, promoters purchase
100,000 shares at $1 per share ($0.20 cash and $0.80 various intan-
gibles) while the public purchases 100,000 shares of the identical
class of stock at $1 per share (cash). So long as $120,000 of the
30. OSA § 1707.12(A)(5).
31. Id. § 1707.12(A) (7). Note that this implies that a notification regis-
tration can become effective even if the offering is ineligible for notification
registration. If this implication cannot be made then this section is mere sur-
plusage.
32. A comparison of the information required to be submitted for registra-
tion by notification, as set forth in § 1707.08(C), with the requirements
of § 1707.10(B) for registration by qualification, makes it readily appar-
ent that the Division has limited material available on which to judge the mer-
its of an application for notification registration. For example, to register by
qualification the issuer must submit the names of all officers, directors, and
promoters. He must also give the names of all shareholders with a greater
than 10 percent ownership of any class of security, along with a statement of
their present ownership of securities of the issuer and the amount of the securi-
ties covered by the registration statement to which they have indicated an in-
tention to subscribe. OSA §§ 1707.10(B)(2)-(5). The registrant must also
supply a statement of the estimated cash proceeds expected from the offering
and a description of the purposes for which the proceeds will be used. OSA
§ 1707.10(B) (9). Unless the Division specifically requires it, none of this in-
formation need be submitted to register by notification. The information re-
quired under the Ohio Securities Act is essentially the same as under the Uni-
form Securities Act See USA §§ 302, 304.
33. Advisory Board Minutes, June 5, 1971, at 2: "The Board agreed that
the policy justification for permitting certain categories of securities or transac-
tions to be registered on the basis of diminished informational requirements and
without administrative front-end evaluation is the fact that certain securities
and transactions are less likely to generate massive fraud or unfairness."
"The Board tentatively agreed that certain securities and transactions could
reasonably be identified which are characteristically 'safe' and, therefore,
should be permitted to be registered in an automatic process." Advisory Board
Minutes, May 29, 1971, at 16.
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$200,000 consideration received by the company is cash or tangible
property, the major requirement of section 1707.08 (A) (3) is
met.34 Thus, the promoters pay $0.20 cash per share for stock with
tangible assets backing it up to the extent of $0.60 per share, while
the public pays $1 cash per share for stock with the same tangible
asset value per share ($0.60). As a result, the public will realize
a 40 percent dilution in tangible assets per share.
This possibility of substantial dilution is aggravated by the ap-
parent limitation on the administrator's power to require that the is-
suer fully disclose the dilution -by means of a prospectus or offering
circular. Section 1707.11(L) of the OSA gives the administrator
power to require 'by rule that a prospectus be distributed as a
condition of registration "if -the issue is to be purchased by more
than twenty-five persons." By negative implication, the administra-
tor does not have this power if the issue is to be purchased by 25
persons or fewer. Since this is one of the conditions for eligibility
under section 1707.08(A) (3),3 5 those who seek to register under
this section cannot be required as a condition of registration to dis-
close to their purchasers the existence or extent of any dilution.36
The situation is ripe for fraud, 7 and even if no fraud has occurred
in a given case, the question arises whether the issuance of this secur-
34. The total consideration received ($200,000), minus the intangibles
($80,000), equals $120,000 cash consideration. $120,000 divided by $200,000
equals 60 percent. The requirement that 60 percent of the consideration re-
ceived be cash or tangible property has been met. See text accompanying note
22 supra.
35. Text accompanying note 23 supra. Note that if this implication is not
accepted, the Commissioner of Securities may have power to require a prospec-
tus in offerings not covered by § 1707.43. But see note 55 infra.
36. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF COPORATIONS AND
OTHER BusnqEss ENTERPRiSES §§ 105-06 (2d ed. 1970); cf. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908); Old Domin-
ion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315, 74 N.E. 653
(1905). There may be civil liability if the promoters who are in control of
the corporation cause it to issue securities fraudulently. But securities registra-
tion is intended to eliminate the need to resort to these after-the-fact remedies.
37. An argument can be made that information regarding the issuer is
available to investors since the registration statement filed with the Commis-
sioner becomes a matter of public record. Thus, the argument continues, the
ends of disclosure are met, and all a prospective purchaser need do is contact
the Division and peruse the information on file to form a basis for an informed
investment decision. The obvious weakness in this argument is that it presup-
poses a level of sophistication and interest in the ordinary investor that is sel-
dom borne out in practice. It also runs contrary to the fundamental objective
of blue sky legislation, the protection of the unwary, unsophisticated investor
from securities offerings that are potentially fraudulent or unfair. See text ac-
companying note 1 supra.
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ity and -the resulting 40 percent tangible asset dilution can be con-
sidered presumptively fair and reasonable.
Another type of dilution, that which accompanies the issuance
of "cheap stock," gives rise to even more serious questions about the
fairness and reasonableness of certain offerings that are permitted
by this section of the OSA. Cheap stock dilution, in contrast to the
type of dilution discussed above, exists when there is a disparity be-
tween the fair market value of the consideration (as opposed to the
nature of the consideration) paid by a corporate insider, agent or
employee and the consideration paid by the public.3 8 That cheap
stock problems will arise under this section may be illustrated by this
hypothetical situation. Suppose at the -time corporation X is formed
promoters purchase 100,000 shares of corporation X stock at $0.20
per share and sell another 100,000 shares of the identical class of
stock to the public at $1 per share. So long as the $120,000 con-
sideration received by the company is cash or tangible property, the
first requirement of section 1707.08 (A) (3) has been met.3 9 The
public's investment has been diluted by 40 percent without any re-
quirement that the dilution be disclosed or justified by the pro-
moters. 40 Although cheap stock is not necessarily undesirable, it is
38. The Midwest Securities Commissioners Association presumes the ex-
istence of cheap stock under certain circumstances.
Any securities sold or issued within two years prior to the public of-
fering date to persons who at the time of sale or issuance were under-
writers, promoters, finders, officers, directors, employees, or con-
trolling stockholders of the issuer, for a consideration lower than the
proposed net public offering price of such securities, including options
and warrants exercised, in the absence of any public market for such
securities or any substantial change in the earnings or financial posi-
tion of the issuer, shall be presumed to be "cheap stock."
Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, Statement of Policy on Cheap
Stock, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4761 (1968). The statement of policy also
specifies two conditions that must be met before cheap stock may be considered
justified:
1. The shares are sold or issued by an issuer which is in the promo-
tional or developmental stage.
2. The number of shares sold or issued shall have a reasonable rela-
tionship to the proposed offering price.
Id.
Note that § 1707.08(A) (3) is not subject to these promotional limitations.
Similar protection could be supplied under § 1707.08(A) (3) by the inclusion
of a fairness rule.
39. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
40. There would be 200,000 shares of stock outstanding: 100,000 shares
owned by the promoters and 100,000 shares owned by the public. Upon disso-
lution the total assets of the corporation, $120,000, would be divided equally be-
tween the promoters and the public. Thus the public would receive $60,000,
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certainly a proper matter for regulatory concern. 41
Admittedly cheap stock may lose its character as such and be-
come stock issued for consideration that is not wholly cash or other
tangible property. Stock is no longer cheap if the difference between
the price at which it was issued and the price to the public is fully
accounted for as compensation to the promoters for organizing the
company or as a return for intangibles assigned to the company or
as a reward to a small insider group for providing early financing. 4
2
The issuance of stock to insiders at a bargain price might be a valid
entrepreneurial increment in many cases. However, adequate safe-
guards must be provided to prevent excesses and abuse.43
Explicit rules or regulations have been adopted in a number of
states in order to regulate cheap stock. Such rules are also useful,
though to a lesser extent,44 in determining whether tangible asset di-
lution percentages are fair and reasonable.45 One approach in at-
tempting to define what is a "fair, just, and equitable" amount of
dilution has been to set a quantitative limit on the dilution permitted.
Various limits have been established, but the most common rule pro-
hibits dilution greater than 331 percent. 46  One state, however,
permits no dilution and requires that the promoters' preincorporation
resulting in a $40,000 loss and 40 percent dilution of their original investment
of $100,000 (100,000 shares at $1 per share).
41. Hueni 1423-24.
42. For additional justifications, see id.
43. See note 38 supra.
44. Dilution that results from a disparity in the nature of the consideration
paid is not so serious as the dilution that results from cheap stock, since the
book value of the intangible assets may be at least partially recoverable upon
liquidation. Thus, the actual dilution will be decreased.
45. Uniform Securities Act § 306(a) (2) (F) allows the administrator to
issue a stop order if there have been "unreasonable amounts of ...promot-
ers' profits or participation." Clause (E) allows for the issuance of a stop order
if "the offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would
so operate." Although fraud is not limited to common law deceit, USA § 401
(d), its application in this clause was not designed to be as broad as the "fair,
just, and equitable" standard. USA § 306, Comment E. This Act embodied
an attempt to isolate and specify the factors that administrators should consider
when using a merit approach. MoFsKY 15.
46. Alabama, 1 BLuE. SKY L. REP. 5601 (1960); Arkansas, id. % 7605
(1972); Hawaii, id. f 14,831 (1970); Kansas, 2 id. 19,707 (1972); Louisiana
2 id. 21,603 (1973); Michigan 2 id. 25,635 (1968); Utah, 3 id. 47,604
(1973); Wyoming, 3 id. 53,612 (1968). Missouri allows 50 percent dilu-
tion, 2 id. 28,606 (1972). Ohio permits 50 percent dilution for a promo-
tional company and 80 percent dilution for a going concern. Omo SECutITmS
BULL., June 1973, at 13-14. In the light of the generally accepted standards of
what is fair and reasonable, it would appear that the amount of dilution per-
mitted by the Division is excessive.
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subscription equal the public offering price.47 Other states use a dif-
ferent approach: Instead of setting a specific limit on the percent-
age of dilution allowable, they provide that to be justified cheap
stock must (1) be issued by a corporation in its promotional stage,
(2) be issued in an amount that bears a reasonable relation to the
total number of shares issued, and (3) be issued for consideration
that is reasonably related to the public offering price.48 The rules
in these states plainly respond to the argument that to set a fixed
limit is inequitable, since more than 33% percent dilution could
conceivably be justified under certain circumstances. Moreover, in
other situations such a percentage might be too high. Thus it is con-
tended that each offering should be judged on its own merits.49
In any event, if Ohio is to adopt a quantitative standard, it can
certainly be concluded that the 40 percent dilution permitted by sec-
tion 1707.08(A) (3) (a) is not presumptively fair, in view of the
general acceptance of the standard that permits only 331/3 percent
dilution. Indeed it exceeds the permissible limits in at least ten
states.5" This is not to assert that 40 percent dilution is presump-
tively unfair or unreasonable, but merely that the matter is in
doubt.51 If the offering is such that the price differential must be
justified, then the nearly automatic notification registration should
not be available, since such registration is based on the theory that
the issue is presumptively fair and there is little need for administra-
47. South Carolina, 3 BLuE SKY L. RE'. f 43,660 (1963).
48. E.g., South Dakota, 3 id. 1 44,609 (1969). This is also the approach
of the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association Policy on Cheap Stock,
1 id. 4761 (1968). See note 38 supra.
49. Hueni 1424; see Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Pro-
motions, 1969 DUKE L.J. 273, 285-86. Under provisions for registration by
qualification, the percentages noted in text above are allowed after administra-
tive scrutiny of the offering.
50. See note 46 supra.
51. Normally a substantial disparity in price between stock sold to the pub-
lic and any cheap stock previously sold would of itself be grounds for the de-
nial of the registration without inquiry into whether the disparity can be ac-
counted for in terms of future services.
The sale of securities to underwriters or promoters, at prices substan-
tially below the public offering price, at a time in close proximity to
the public offering date, will hereafter be looked upon with great dis-
favor and will be considered as a basis for the denial of the applica-
tion except in unusual circumstances, such as favorable developments
after the date of sale to the underwriters or promoters and before the
public offering dates, sufficient to justify the differential in price.
NASA PRoCEEDINGS 113-15 (1955), quoted in L. Loss & E. Cownrr, BLUE
SKY LAw 330 (1958). But cf. note 38 supra (discrepancy in price to pro-
moters within given span of years gives rise to presumption of services).
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live scrutiny.52
Codification of a provision permitting 40 percent dilution not
only is arguably unfair and clearly contrary to the rationale for noti-
fication registration, but it also is unwise, because it eliminates -the
administrator's discretion in the area. If experience shows that
this percentage is too high, the administrator is virtually powerless
to effectuate any change. The dilution limitations that other states
have adopted are administrative rules and regulations that provide
guidelines for the enforcement of the statute,58 not built in condi-
tions. Section 1707.08(B) allows the administrator to "modify or
further condition the eligibility" of any securities registered under
section 1707.08(A)(3) by rule, if it is in the public interest, or
if there is a continuing history of acts or practices that are prohibited
by section 1707.1254 and such acts or practices cannot be effectively
regulated "through -the exercise of the other regulatory or enforce-
ment powers authorized" by the Act. However, there remains the
serious question whether the power to "modify or further condition
the eligibility" would permit the administrator to disregard a definite
standard that has been expressly set by statute.5"
An additional problem, which compounds the difficulty of deter-
mining what is a presumptively fair dilution of -the public's invest-
ment, arises from the specific wording of section 1707.08(A) (3)
(a). Suppose promoters purchase 100,000 shares of stock at $0.10
per share from corporation X. Then, within two years, they issue
100,000 shares of the same class of stock to the public at $2 per
share. The total consideration paid for the 200,000 shares is
$210,000. The promoters have $105,000 worth of net asset
participation in return for an investment of $10,000 while the public
has $105,000 net asset participation in return for an investment of
$200,000. The requirement of section 1707.08(A)(3)(a) has,
on its face, been met; 100 percent of the consideration paid for
the shares appears to be cash. In this particular situation the pub-
lic's investment is diluted 473 percent (100 percent, minus $105,-
52. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
53. See note 46 supra.
54. § 1707.12 also gives the administrator the power to issue a stop order
to deny effectiveness after registration.
55. § 1707.43 gives the administrator a general rule-making authority in
addition to the specific authority granted elsewhere in the Act. This au-
thority is limited by § 1707.45, which creates a Board of Securities Review
with the power to disapprove any existing or proposed rule or order pro-
mulgated by the administration.
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000 divided by $200,000) and, depending on the price differential,
could asymptotically approach 100 percent. Even though the dilu-
tion exceeds 40 percent, the offering will still be eligible since all
the consideration is cash.
On the other hand, that cash was received does not mean that it
was the only consideration; it may be that -the insiders actually pro-
vided additional intangible consideration, for example, services, in
which case dilution of more than 40 percent would violate the statu-
tory requirement. If it can be shown that the fair market value of
the stock was higher than the cash paid in by the promoters, it is
reasonable to conclude that they paid additional consideration in the
form of intangibles. Courts charged with the application of the tax
laws have wrestled with the problem of determining the fair market
value of stock at the time it was acquired by the promoter. In Bruce
Berckmans,5" the issue was whether a taxpayer who purchased stock
at $1 per share which was later sold to the public at $9.50 per share
received compensation for his services for income tax purposes in an
amount equal to the difference between $1 and $9.50. Before the
Tax Court could answer this question it had to determine whether the
fair market value at the time of the sale to the taxpayer was greater
than the purchase price. The court found that the price paid was the
fair market value and that there was no compensation received. The
court explained the lower purchase price by pointing out that when
the insiders purchased their shares the success of -the venture de-
pended upon certain contingencies: obtaining SEC and state blue sky
approval and receiving a definite commitment from the underwrit-
ers.57 Faced with a slightly different situation in Elsie L. Dees,5"
the court sought to determine whether a taxpayer who had purchased
stock for less than the public offering price received compensation
for his services. Because some shares had already been sold to the
public at a higher price, this was held to be a bargain purchase, and
the difference was accounted for as compensation for services ren-
dered or to be rendered. The court implicitly recognized the diffi-
culty of ascertaining the value of the shares purchased when it noted
that the price paid by the public might have been excessive and that
56. 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 508 (1961).
57. The contingencies referred to by the court were largely technical in
nature and it is unlikely that the taxpayer would have invested if he had had
serious doubts concerning the completion of the transaction. D. HERwrrZ,
BusINESS PLANNING: MATERIALS ON THE PLANNING OF CORPORATE TRANSAC-
TIONS 275 (1966).
58. 31 P-H Tax CL Mem. 915 (1962).
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the true value could lie somewhere between the public and the pri-
vate offering prices.59
Both Berckmans and Dees illustrate the difficulty of determining
-the fair market value of stock at the time of acquisition. If in fact
there was a bargain purchase, it can be presumed that the difference
between the fair market value and the purchase price was paid in
-the form of services. 60 Under the proposed bill compensation for
services may not exceed 40 percent of the total consideration. But
to determine whether consideration was received in the form of serv-
ices one must first look to the fair market value of the securities
and decide whether it was higher -than the cash paid in. This can
be an extremely difficult process 61 and because the only ostensible
consideration is cash, the burden of proving noncompliance with the
statute falls ultimately on the administrator, rather than the issuer
asserting eligibility under section 1707.08 (A) (3).62
Section 1707.08(A) (3) (a) presents some serious problems.
No matter how it is interpreted, the section fixes the permissible di-
lution at least 40 perc'ent under all circumstances, which conflicts
59. Id. at 930.
60. See D. HERwrrz, supra note 57, at 274 (despite appearance of pur-
chase, compensation may still be present).
61. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra; cf. Hueni 1426.
62. The administrator could seek to create a presumption by rule that ad-
ditional intangible consideration was present, but he would still face the prob-
lems created by § 1707.08(B). See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
The counterpart of § 1707.08(A)(3) under the current statute, Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.06(A)(1) (Page 1964), requires that none of the
consideration be in the form of intangibles. It raises a number of problems,
however, which are due to the difficulty in determining the value of tangible
property and the danger of dilution resulting from a prior issuance of cheap
stock. There is a history of Division discomfort with this particular section.
A recent Statement of Policy indicated that applications for registration under
§ 1707.06(A)(1) will be subject to immediate suspension unless the ap-
plicant agrees not to commence sale until the Division has reviewed the appli-
cation or there is a signed statement by the applicant that a large number of
terms and conditions have been satisfied. OHIO SEcumrrins BULL., May 1973,
at 10-11.
This difficulty will not be remedied by the enactment of OSA § 1707.08
(A)(3). In fact, the valuation problem will be compounded since the new
section allows 40 percent of the purchase price to be paid with intangibles.
Under both provisions the Division is placed in the position of having to sec-
ond-guess during the brief period allotted by statute for review of the applica-
tion, the value of consideration received. Such valuation problems cut against
the presumption underlying notification registration that the offering in ques-
tion is very probably free from fraud or unfairness. See note 33 supra and
accompanying text. It was this uncertainty in valuation that the Advisory
Board sought to avoid. See Advisory Board Minutes, June 5, 1971, at 6.
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with the rationale for providing only summary review under the noti-
fication registration provision.6 3  Furthermore, one interpretation of
the section would theoretically permit the dilution to approach 100
percent unless the administrator can prove that part of the considera-
tion paid for the securities was not "tangible property." 64  Even if
it is later established that the issue was ineligible for notification reg-
istration and a stop order is issued the damage will already have
been done. In addition, -there will be no remedy available to the
purchaser for the nonregistration of securities sold in the interim bet-
ween the attempted registration and the issuance of the stop order.
Section 1707.12(C) (2) provides that a stop order will not have
a retroactive effect and securities sold prior to the issuance of the
order will be deemed to have been in compliance with the Act.65
The proposed section, therefore, will not fulfill the prophylactic pur-
pose that blue sky legislation is generally designed to serve. 66
The three additional requirements for notification registration un-
der section 1707.08(A) (3) present further problems. Section
1707.08(A) (3) (b) states that the offering may not be purchased
by more than 25 persons. 67 There are two possible rationales for
this provision. The first is that 25 people are too few to be of any
consequence to the Division of Securities. However, if the blue sky
laws are to protect the investor,68 individuals should not be deprived
of this protection merely because they happen to be members of a
group that is arbitrarily deemed too small to warrant Division con-
cern. The more plausible rationale for the limitation is that this is
not a public offering but a private one, and that private offerees on
the whole are sophisticated enough to understand and avoid the dan-
gers involved. 69 This reasoning presumes the purchasers have all the
63. See text accompanying notes 34-53 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 26, 54-62 supra.
65. Under the existing statute a sale or contract made in violation of any
of the registration provisions is voidable at the election of the purchaser.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Page 1964).
66. "It is the policy and purpose of this legislation to prevent ensnarling
of the public by unscrupulous dealers ... and to provide some method of su-
pervision and regulation of what is offered... ." 14 W. FLETcHER, CYcLo-
PEDIA OF COPORATrMONS 164 (perm. ed. 1966); see Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio,
Inc., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1964); BLooMEmNHAL
§ 14.08 (administrator may determine if investors are to have access at all to
certain types of securities).
67. See text accompanying note 23 supra. It is worthy of note that this
may be extended to 50 or more persons owing to the definition of "person"
in § 1707.08(A) (3). See text accompanying note 27 supra.
68. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
69. There was some indication by the Advisory Board that this was the
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facts, although there is no requirement that a prospectus or offering
circular be made available to the purchasers and, indeed, the Com-
missioner cannot require their use. 70  Furthermore, the mere limita-
tion of the number of purchasers does not in any way guarantee their
sophistication. 71  And even if a numbers limit did preclude all but
the sophisticated, the fact remains that this limit applies to purchas-
ers, not offerees, so that the number of those who may be ap-
proached in the course of an offering may far exceed the 25 persons
who eventually do purchase. Thus, those who purchase could come
from a group of offerees so large as to raise absolutely no presump-
tion as to sophistication. Since the actual purchasers are drawn from
the entire spectrum of offerees their sophistication cannot be pre-
sumed. Accordingly, the numbers test should apply to the offerees
rather than the purchasers if it is to have any meaning at all.
72
The next section, 1707.08 (A) (3) (c), limits the amount of
commissions paid by the issuer to 3 percent of the proceeds received
from the sale of the security.73 The purposes of this provision are
to prevent excessive dilution of -the investors' funds over that already
allowed,74 to insure "that -the maximum portion of the proceeds
would inure to the issue,"' 75 and, perhaps, to prevent overly aggres-
sive underwriting. 7 6 On the other hand, there is "some danger of
reason for the 25-person limit. "The discussion focused upon a comment to
the effect that most attorneys and issuers in Ohio have come to regard 25 as
the number of purchasers who may readily purchase securities without concern
over a public offering." Advisory Board Minutes, June 5, 1971, at 10.
70. See text accompanying note 35 supra. But see MoFsKY 20 (without
some form of limited offering exemption, administrators would be swamped).
See 3 BLOOMENTHAL §§ 4.05[4]-[5], where the author discusses the implica-
tions of the numbers test and emphasizes the requirement that investors have
all the facts.
71. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); cf. Bryant v.
Uland, 327 F. Supp. 439, 442-43 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also 3 BLOOMENTHAL
§§ 4.05[4]-[5].
72. The present policy of the Division of Securities is to handle an appli-
cation for registration on the basis of a cursory review if the offering is limited
to 10 persons and such persons might be expected to have sufficient informa-
tion with respect to the issuer. Omo SEcuxrrms BULL., May 1973, at 11. But
cf. MOFSKY 24-25 .(disadvantages inherent in limiting the number of offerees).
73. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
74. See MOFSKY 22 (discussion of limits on commissions with respect to
private offerings). Most states also limit the commissions and expenses paid
an investment banker in connection with a public offering. Id.; see USA
§ 306(a) (2) (F). The National Association of Securities Dealers has imposed
restrictions on underwriting compensation. See generally Ratner, Regulation
of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 348 (1970).
75. Advisory Board Minutes, June 5, 1971, at 8-9.
76. Cf. SEC, DIscLosURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL AD-
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discouraging -the use of professionals in preparing the registration
statement if the limitation on expenses [is] too stringent."7'' The
use of professional financial intermediaries can provide experience
and expertise that the promoters lack.78 There is reason for concern
when a statute permits an offering to be registered with only limited
review by the Division and at the same time discourages resort to
professional assistance.
The fourth and final requirement of section 1707.08 (A) (3)
gives the administrator the power to deny or revoke registration when
an offering violates the spirit, but not the letter, of the previous three
requirements. This is the "good faith" requirement. 79  This provi-
sion might operate, for example, to prevent dilution from approach-
ing 100 percent, as it theoretically could under the proposed stat-
ute.80 However, "good faith" can generally only be determined in
retrospect, and the 5-day period before the registration becomes ef-
fective is seldom sufficient to make such a determination. The ad-
ministrator could promulgate rules and regulations that would help
define this requirement, but, regardless of further definition, it is un-
likely that sufficient information would be available to the adminis-
trator with the registration statement to enable him to make a finding
before the registration became effective.8 ' If this is true, then the
requirement is not an effective screening device. It does not enable
the administrator to prevent those who are acting in bad faith from
registering under section 1707.08 (A) (3). The "good faith" re-
quirement can empower the administrator to revoke the registration
statements of those who fail to meet this requirement.82 If the ad-
MINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 AcTs-THE WHEAT REPORT 60-
61 (1969).
77. Advisory Board Minutes, June 5, 1971, at 8.
78. See MoFsKy 22-23.
79. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 26, 54-60 supra.
81. See note 32 supra.
82. One use that the administrator could find for the § 1707.08(3)
"good faith" requirement is the discouragement of avoidance of registration re-
quirements through the use of "conduits." As one recommendation to the Ad-
visory Board suggested, the phrases "good faith" and "not for the purposes of
avoiding" the provisions of the section have "substantive content":
Its purpose is to warn an offeror against claiming an exemption upon
the ground that he sold securities to a limited number of persons who
intended from the start to act as mere conduits in a widespread dis-
tribution by immediately reselling the securities which they acquired
from the offeror.
Omo DIVISION OF SECURTIES, CoMPREHENsIVE LIST OF PROPOSALS RECEVED
BY THE OHIO DIVISION OF SECURITIES FOR THE REVISION OF SENATE BILL 338,
1975]
322 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:306
ministrator makes such a determination, section 1707.12(A) (7)
allows the issuance of a stop order when a security registered by noti-
fication "is not eligible for such registration. '83 But the stop order
will not have retroactive effect.84 As a result, the good faith re-
quirement will prove to be of limited value.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of blue sky laws is to protect public investors. One
method of protection is to require the registration of securities. Noti-
fication registration is a simplified and nearly automatic form of reg-
istration for those high-grade securities, which can be presumed
safe. Because of the limited information required before registration
and the short interval of time before -the registration becomes effec-
tive, it is essential that only securities that are almost certainly fair
and free -from fraud be permitted to take advantage of this simplified
procedure.
Section 1707.08(A) (3) of the proposed Ohio Securities Act is
inconsistent with the policy behind notification registration. The re-
quirement that only 60 percent of the consideration be in the form
of cash or tangible property allows too great a risk of serious dilu-
tion, particularly when even greater dilution is possible from the prior
at 11 (1973). Note that the proper focus of the administrator's scrutiny
should be on the investment intent of the offerees (or purchasers). §
402(b) (9) (A) of the Uniform Securities Act expressly requires that "the seller
reasonably believes that all the buyers in this state. . . are purchasing for in-
vestment." A purchaser's investment intent often determines whether a trans-
action is a "private offering" within the meaning of the statutory exception or
a disguised public offering and as such subject to the registration provision.
See generally 1 Loss 665. The conduit problem also arises in the context of
two exceptions to the Securities Act of 1933, the intrastate offering excep-
tion § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(A)(11) (1970), and the nonpublic offering
exception § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). The SEC originally adopted a
hard-line attitude toward violating issuers and held them to a standard of strict
liability. In time, however, they adopted a due care standard of liability and
have not pursued corporate issuers who have taken reasonable steps to insure
that their stocks do not pass through conduits to the general public. The recent
trend has been to objectify the due care standard for determining whether a
purchaser takes with an investment intent. Compare SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) with SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223
(Jan. 11, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 78,487 (1971-1972 Transfer
Binder). See generally Lewis v. Ling, 353 F. Supp. 241, 244-45 & n.6 (1973).
83. § 1707.12(A)(7).
84. § 1707.12(c)(2) provides that a stop order will not have a retro-
active effect and securities sold prior to the issuance of the order will be
deemed to have been in compliance with the Act. See text accompanying note
66 supra.
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issuance of cheap stock. Certainly the section could be improved
in several ways. The permissible percentage of dilution could be
reduced. The Division could be authorized to require an offering
circular at its discretion. And the limitation on the number of pur-
chasers could be changed to apply to offerees. These modifications,
however, do not correct the fundamental weakness of the section-
its inability to assure that only high-grade securities will qualify. Be-
cause of its failure to conform with the underlying rationale of notifi-
cation registration, the section should not be enacted into law.
FREDERICK J. KREBS
